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1. INTRODUCTION
Assessing costs and benefits of alternative exchange rate re-
gimes has been one of the key questions in international fi-
nance. However, empirical literature on ex-post evaluation of 
the contribution of exchange rate regimes, in particular curren-
cy boards (CB), is fairly limited. We are aware of only two papers 
that aim at measuring the efficacy of CBs: Ghosh et al. (2000), 
Levy-Yevati and Sturzenegger (2002), which cover a long period 
of post-Bretton Woods era and CBs across the world including 
colonial currency board arrangements. However, the currency 
boards in Eastern Europe differ in many respects, as discussed 
below. The present paper offers an out-of-sample test of the 
efficacy of currency boards, free from volatile post-launch ef-
fects, focusing on European transition economies. 
European transition economies offer an ideal set-up to assess 
the efficacy of the CB regimes, as they are a group of small and 
similar economies among which there is sufficient variety in 
terms of exchange rate regime. This enables us to identify what 
difference a currency board makes in terms of growth and in-
flation performance. Our sample covers 14 countries. Three of 
them have currency board regime: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia. 
By choosing a recent sample period 1997 - 2011, we abstract 
from effects as such broken trade dependencies (former So-
viet republics), initial conditions, the volatile period just pre-
vailing around the launch of the CB and post-launch rebound 
in growth (“catch-up growth”).1Thus, the current study aims 
at documenting the long term performance of CB regimes, in 
particular to assess whether the stabilization brought about by 
CB regimes translates into achieving the ultimate goal of fos-
tering growth. Our sample period includes a substantial global 
crisis, which offers a good test of any macroeconomic policy’s 
efficacy robust to business cycle variation.
CB’s credibility effect on inflationary expectations is the main 
theoretical argument to establish a link between CB regimes 
and growth performance. Even though much has been written 
about CBs institutional and organizational aspects, only two 
papers systematically test whether the hypothesized ultimate 
benefit of CBs on growth and inflation materializes. Ghosh et 
al. (2000) find that countries with currency boards have expe-
rienced lower inflation and higher growth compared to either 
floating regimes or simple pegs.  However, their growth results 
do not account for the rebound effect from depressed pre-
adoption levels. Accounting for those rebound effects might 
significantly change their results. The findings of Ghosh et al. 
(2000) are consistent with the descriptive analysis of Gulde and 
Keller (2000), who claim that Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia 
have experienced lower inflation and higher growth than those 
EU accession economies with other regimes. Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) find, however, lower inflation at the cost 
of lower growth for both conventional pegs and currency board 
countries. Korhonen (2000) discusses the anecdotal evidence: 
he concludes that while favorable effects of currency boards 
in the Baltic countries2 is more difficult to find, a comparative 
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1In Bulgaria, CB was launched in July 1997. We exclude this period for Bulgaria with a dummy.
2 Latvia’s intitial peg in February 1994 to the IMF special drawing right’s (SDR) basket renders it as having had a regime very similar to that of a cur-
rency board. This is why the three Baltic countries are often considered together when investigating the impact of fixed pegs on macroeconomic 
performance (De Haan et al. 2001). However, for the purposes of the current paper, we treat Latvia as having a fixed peg for the 1997-2002 period.
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analysis shows that currency boards have not produced worse 
economic performance.
An interesting common characteristic of European CBs 
is the unorthodox nature which allows temporary devia-
tions from the one-to-one relationship between H (high-
powered money) and foreign exchange (FX) reserves. This 
is achieved by a buffer of over-backed H (i.e., a smaller H 
than FX reserves, which creates some room for the CB to 
play the role of lender of last resort in cases of emergency. 
(Nenovsky and Hristov, 2002). In addition, there are some 
atypical items in the balance sheet of the quasi currency 
boards and the monetary institution can employ a number 
of monetary policy instruments. Last, but not the least, un-
der the quasi-CBs the monetary authority can vary reserve 
requirements hence conduct monetary policy. These atyp-
ical items and monetary policy tools differ among the CB 
countries Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia (Nenovsky et al. 
2001). Our results will reveal the effect of these unortho-
dox CB arrangements.
Section II reviews the literature on currency boards in 
general, and those in European transition economies in 
particular. It also presents the main ideas from the litera-
ture on growth determinants, which will guide our selec-
tion of controls in our empirical specificadtion. Section III 
describes the data employed in this study and empirical 




For a general introduction on currency board regime see 
Hanke (2001). In an orthodox CB, the home currency is 
pegged at an official parity to a foreign currency that is 
deemed reliable. The monetary base (H) is 100% covered 
by gold and foreign exchange reserves (FX). H follows any 
changes in FX. CBs in their orthodox form evidenced a 
strong record of ensuring stabilization and domestic cur-
rency credibility in colonial regimes before World War I. 
After World War II and with the fall of colonial regimes, 
however, the newly independent countries largely aban-
doned their CBs. 
Currency Boards in European Transition Economies 
Nenovsky et al� (2001) compare the institutional and or-
ganizational aspects of quasi currency boards in Bulgaria, 
Lithuania and Estonia and find some noteworthy differ-
ences. As a quasi CB-type discretionary tool, the monetary 
authority in all three countries can manipulate reserve re-
quirements, responding to inflows or outflows of foreign 
exchange in a flexible manner without an impact on the 
exchange rate. However, the presence of the government 
fiscal account on the liabilities section of the central banks’ 
balance sheets in Bulgaria and Lithuania is an additional 
monetary tool available to these countries. For Bulgaria, 
Nenovsky and Hristov (2002) find that the inclusion of the 
government fiscal account on the liabilities section of the 
balance sheet weakens the cointegration relationship be-
tween the monetary base and foreign reserves and intro-
duces macroeconomic instability. 
Minea & Rault (2011) investigate whether the adoption 
of the currency board in Bulgaria has helped towards a 
differentially better integration with the European Mon-
etary Union (EMU) and meeting the Maastricht criteria. 
They find that the responses of Bulgarian variables to ECB 
interest rate fluctuations are less persistent and less sig-
nificant than what the literature has suggested for other 
CEE economies with more flexible exchange rate regimes. 
Their result still holds when accounting for different sourc-
es of cross-country heterogeneity. Ivanova (2009) argues 
that the introduction of the currency board in Bulgaria en-
hanced the confidence of foreign creditors and facilitated 
borrowing from international markets. Thus, the currency 
board in Bulgaria has significant  implications for both 
growth and inflation in the country.
Purfield and Rosenberg (2010) look at the impact of the 
global financial crisis of 2008-09 on the Baltics, which, de-
spite bringing per-capita income in these countries back 
to 2005-6 levels, fuelling inflation, and forcing a devalu-
ation with huge fiscal and nominal wage adjustment, did 
not destroy confidence in the exchange rate or cause a 
banking system crisis. However, this result by itself does 
not speak in favor of currency boards as the study does not 
compare the performance of flexible or other pegged re-
gimes’ performance over the period of the crisis as control 
groups. De Haan et al. (2001) finds that Estonia has been 
the most successful Baltic country in reducing inflation, 
which was partly due to its initial choice of a pegging cur-
rency in line with Estonia’s output and inflation character-
istics. At the same time, the author claims that Latvia’s less 
appropriate peg, and Lithuania’s inadequate peg are con-
sistent with their worse inflation performance compared 
to Estonia. Once again, since the study does not compare 
Baltic countries’ performance in reducing inflation to that 
of alternative exchange rate regimes, it is not indicative of 
the performance of the currency board in macroeconomic 
stabilization. 
Using SVAR methodology, López (2007) casts light to the 
growth performance of alternative exchange rate arrange-
ments. The author finds that the exchange rates of Czech 
Republic and Hungary have propagated shocks during the 
period 1995-2005, whereas the exchange rate of Poland 
has been used as an output stabilizer. Additionally, the au-
thor finds that demand and monetary shocks account for 
most of the variability in both nominal and real exchange 
rates in the Czech Republic and Hungary. The somewhat 
disappointing performance of alternative exchange rate 
regimes in bringing macroeconomic stability could be 
wrongly interpreted as evidence in favor of a currency 
board. However, Lakchieva (2003) finds that the volatility 
of the euro-dollar exchange rate in Estonia and Bulgaria, 
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both of which with currency boards, implies currency risk 
to these countries. As both countries fix their exchange 
rates to the euro in the framework of a currency board, 
the findings of Lakchieva (2003) are an argument against 
the stabilizing impact of a currency board regime. 
Using a standard growth equation with a current account 
reversal impulse dummy, Melecky (2005) investigates the 
direct impact of current account reversals on growth in 
CEE countries. According to theory, a current account re-
versal must have a significantly negative impact on growth. 
The author finds that after a current account reversal, the 
growth rate declines by 1.10 percent in the current year 
and the negative impact of the reversal subsides in 3.3 
years , when the actual growth rate is back at its equilib-
rium level. Unfortunately, in the analysis, results are inter-
preted on the basis of the whole panel, and no differentia-
tion among the performance of alternative exchange rate 
arrangements has been made. 
Sohinger (2005) explores the impact of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) on growth and convergence of the CEE and 
Baltic economies to the European Union, arguing in favor 
of a differentially positive impact of FDI on institution build-
ing. Because of the endogeneity problem between growth 
and FDI and because the author does not differentiate 
between countries with different exchange rate arrange-
ments, it is impossible to determine the contribution of 
both FDI and currency boards to growth for the transition 
economies. Staehr (2010) finds evidence for concurrent 
real and nominal convergence among the CEE countries in 
terms of growth and inflation performance. This suggests 
that despite the presence of alternative exchange rate re-
gimes in CEE countries, their macroeconomic performance 
does not significantly differ.
Growth Determinants
There is no consensus in the literature about the variables 
significantly and robustly affecting growth. Therefore, 
different model specifications employ a different set of 
variables with only very few consensus variables appear-
ing in all models. In order to identify which variables are 
related to growth by being the ones showing significance 
most of the time in combinations with other variables, 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) runs two million regressions. In his 
regressions, the author combines a couple of consensus 
variables each time and combinations of all the rest of the 
variables proposed in the literature. He is able to identify 
a set of 65 variables that are important to growth in the 
general case. 
It is imperative to employ a comprehensive set of carefully-
selected control variables. Synthesizing the findings of Sa-
la-i-Martin (1997) and a large body of literature on deter-
minants of economic growth (see Barro, 1991; Murphy et 
al. 1993; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002), we ab-
stract from certain variables generally employed in growth 
regressions, as we believe that these are either irrelevant 
to our transition economies and observation period (war, 
tropic, disease), do not exhibit significant country-specific 
differences (religion, crops), or are endogenous to other 
important variables (e.g, FDI is endogenous to growth). 
At the same time, we consider variables proposed as 
impacting growth in transition economies (Falcetti et al. 
2002, 2006; De Melo et al. 1996, 2001; Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 2002; Gulde et al. 2000; Havrylyshyn et al. 
2003).
Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes variables accounting for 
country-specific initial conditions as important for growth 
in the general case. In their growth studies of transition 
economies, De Melo et al. (2001) and Falcetti et al. (2006) 
employ an index of initial conditions3. The initial conditions 
index incorporates the extent of prior reforms for each 
country in its initial value. I employ this index as it lowers 
endogeneity among different initial conditions variables. 
Since we abstract from the first post-transition years, we 
are not interested in the initial conditions at the beginning 
of the period, but rather, in the interaction of this variable 
with time. Initial conditions can be broken up into two 
principal component clusters, the first of which positively 
and the other - negatively related to growth (De Melo et 
al. 1996). Therefore, the expected sign of the variable is 
undetermined. Most studies find that different starting 
points matter for growth, yet their impact decreases over 
time (e.g., Berg et al. 1999; De Melo et al. 2001). At the 
same time, the effect of policies on growth should increase 
(Korhonen 2000). 
Romer (1990) and Barro (1991) consider education as 
a major variable affecting growth in general. Senhadji 
(2000) and Rapacki, & Próchniak (2009) find that changes 
in TFP are the most important determinant of growth for 
transition economies. Although in their study of transition 
economies, Falcetti et al. (2006) dismiss education on the 
claim that data on education is of doubtful quality, the 
newly available dataset by Barro and Lee (2011) provides 
the needed information. 
Following the discussions in the wider economic litera-
ture about the importance of ethnic fractionalization on 
growth, we furthermore consider the interaction with 
time of initial level of ethnic fractionalization as a proxy 
for equal access to participation in economic activity. The 
rationale for including the interaction terms  of education 
with time and ethnic fractionalization with time as sepa-
rate variables in the growth regression is that albeit impor-
tant to growth, neither variable has been included in the 
3Developed  by De Melo et al. (1996), the initial conditions index captures a variety of variables at their initial levels, like income at PPP, urbanization, 
overindustrialization (typical for transition economies), geographical proximity to thriving market economies, natural resource endowments, prior 
economic growth rates, repressed inflation, trade dependence on other communist economies, black market exchange rate premium, change in the 
state structure (new nation states versus members of the decentralized economy), prior economic growth rates, and familiarity with market economy 
at the beginning of transition.
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computation of the initial conditions indicator developed 
by De Melo (1996). I do not believe that re-computing the 
initial components indicator to include education and frac-
tionalization would render the results significantly differ-
ent, as neither education, nor ethnic fractionalization are 
much correlated with any of the component variables of 
the initial conditions index. Therefore, the separate inclu-
sion of initial conditions, education time- interaction term, 
and ethnic fractionalization time-interaction term should 
not be a problem. 
Campos and Coricelli (2002) propose liberalization as im-
portant to growth in transition economies. To account for 
liberalization, I use the liberalization, or the so-called struc-
tural policy reform index computed as the weighted aver-
age of all EBRD transition ratings. Radulescu et al. (2002) 
and Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) find that this weighted aver-
age has a better explanatory power on growth than any of 
the individual ratings alone. According to Falcetti (2006), 
the impact of structural policy reforms on growth is strong 
and robust. De Melo et al. (2001) claim that whereas the 
contemporaneous liberalization step is expected to have a 
negative sign, the accumulated stock of reforms is expect-
ed to show a positive sign. Using alternative specifications 
but the same liberalization index, Fischer et al. (1996) and 
Selowsky and Martin (1997) confirm these claims. In their 
studies, Heybey and Murrell (1999) and Wolf (1999) allow 
for a feedback of growth to structural reforms and Berg 
et al. (1999) and Ghosh (1997) do likewise by adopting 
an instrumental variables approach. Finding a significant 
feedback effect from growth to reforms, Falcetti et al. 
(2002) suggest a simultaneous equation estimation. I fol-
low Falcetti et al. (2006) in considering the lagged value of 
structural policy reform to enter the growth model instead 
of both the current-and lagged values, in order to avoid 
endogeneity.
North (1991), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), 
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Fisher and Sahay (2004) propose 
institutions as important to economic growth. Havryly-
shyn et al. (2003) and De Melo et al. (2001) consider the 
impact of institutions on growth in transitional economies. 
Faia et al. (2008) finds that with a higher quality of insti-
tutions, the effects of political pressures on the exchange 
rate are lower. Following De Melo (2001), I use an institu-
tional proxy based on the EBRD transition indices4� 
A consensus variable I employ to model growth is the size 
of the fiscal balance relative to GDP, whereby its expect-
ed sign is negative in the growth regression. As Beck and 
Laeven (2005) suggest, not all variables are robust to con-
trolling for additional variables. Therefore, my final model 
discards some of the abovementioned variables.
Together with the excess coverage of monetary base with 
foreign exchange, quasi-CB are peculiar with that they 
include the government fiscal account in the liabilities 
section of the balance sheet. For the case of Bulgaria, 
Nenovsky and Hristov find that this inclusion distorts the 
perfect cointegration relationship between the monetary 
base and foreign exchange (Nenovsky and Hristov 2002) 
and destabilizes the Bulgarian economy. Thirdly, under 
the orthodox CB, the monetary authority can manipulate 
reserve requirements and thereby respond to inflows or 
outflows of foreign exchange in a flexible manner without 
an impact on the fixed exchange rate.
Control Variables
In selecting the variables to consider for our out-of sample 
study on growth and inflation, we abstract from some of 
the variables employed in growth regressions by other au-
thors, such as FDI, war (Sturzenegger 2002), and religion 
(Sala-i-Martin 1997). Specifically, we do so as we believe 
that FDI is endogenous to growth. In addition, there were 
no military conflicts in our sample of countries over the 
transition period. Finally, we exclude religion as the reli-
gious make-up of our countries is rather homogenous 
(Christian or non-religious). 
At the same time, we consider variables proposed by Sala-
i-Martin as important to general growth, as well as such 
proposed by De Melo et al. (1996, 2001 and Falcetti et 
al. 2006) as important to growth in transition economies. 
Whereas Sala-i-Martin also uses variables to proxy initial 
conditions in his growth regressions, De Melo et al. (1996, 
2001) and Falcetti et al. (2006) compute an index of initial 
conditions with the help of principal component analysis, 
thereby eliminating endogeneity among the variables. The 
initial conditions index of De Melo et al. (1996) captures a 
variety of variables at their initial levels, like initial level of 
income at PPP, urbanization, overindustrialization (typical 
for transition economies), geographical proximity to thriv-
ing market economies, natural resource endowments, 
prior economic growth rates, repressed inflation, trade 
dependence on other communist economies, black mar-
ket exchange rate premium, change in the state structure 
(new nation states versus members of the decentralized 
economy), prior economic growth rates, and familiarity 
with market economy at the beginning of transition. The 
initial conditions index incorporates the extent of prior re-
forms for each country in its initial value.
Since we abstract from the first post-transition years, we 
are not interested in the initial conditions at the beginning 
of the period, but rather, in the interaction of this variable 
with time. It is not possible to determine the expected sign 
of the initial conditions index in the growth equation, as it 
comprises a variety of variables, half of which positively 
and the other half- negatively related to growth. However, 
at least empirically, most studies find that different start-
ing points matter for growth, yet their impact decreases 
over time (e.g., Berg et al. 1999, De Melo et al. 2001). 
4  For an alternative institutional proxy, see Beck and Laeven (2005).
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Traditionally accepted as a very important determinant of 
growth (Romer 1990, Barro 1991), education  is a variable 
that is absolutely essential to consider for our model. Al-
though Falcetti et al. (2006) dismiss education on the claim 
that data is of doubtful quality, the newly available dataset 
by Barro and Lee (2011) provides the needed information. 
We decide to consider the initial level of education in its 
interaction with time rather than education each period, 
as we believe that subsequent period education rates are 
endogenous to each other. We find support for the inclu-
sion of education in the growth regression for our transi-
tion economies in the work by Senhadji (2000), who finds 
that TFP is the most important determinant of growth for 
these economies. Following the suggestion of Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) that fractionalization impacts growth, we further-
more take the interaction with time of initial level of ethnic 
fractionalization as a proxy for equal access to participa-
tion in economic activity. The rationale for including the 
interaction terms  of education with time and ethnic frac-
tionalization with time as separate variables in the growth 
regression is that albeit important to growth, neither vari-
able has been included in the computation of the initial 
conditions indicator developed by De Melo (1996). We do 
not believe that re-computing the initial components indi-
cator to include education and fractionalization would ren-
der our results significantly different, as neither education, 
nor ethnic fractionalization are much correlated with any 
of the component variables of the initial conditions index. 
Therefore, the separate inclusion of initial conditions, edu-
cation time- interaction term, and ethnic fractionalization 
time-interaction term should not be a problem. 
Another important index besides initial conditions is the 
structural policy reform index, or the so-called liberaliza-
tion index, computed as the weighted average of all EBRD 
ratings for transitional economies. Radulescu et al. (2002) 
and Havrylyshyn et al (1999) find that this weighted aver-
age has a better explanatory power on growth than any 
of the individual rankings alone. In addition, the impact of 
structural policy reforms on growth is strong and robust 
(Falcetti 2006). As De Melo et al. (2001) point out, empir-
ic work shows a negative sign for the contemporaneous 
liberalization step but a positive one for the accumulated 
stock of reforms (De Melo et al. 2001). Heybey and Mur-
rell (1999) and Wolf (1999) allow for a feedback of growth 
to structural reforms, and Berg et al. (1999) and Ghosh 
(1997) do likewise by adopting an instrumental variables 
approach. Falcetti et al. (2002) finds a significant feedback 
effect from growth to reforms and therefore suggest a si-
multaneous equation estimation to identify this interac-
tion. We use the lagged value of structural policy reform 
as determinant for current growth, following Falcetti et al. 
(2006), rather than both current period and lagged value 
of structural policy reforms, as some other studies do, due 
to the inherent endogeneity resulting from the small num-
ber of observation periods in our study. 
Two consensus variables we employ to model growth are 
the annual inflation rate and the size of the fiscal balance 
relative to GDP. Thereby, the expected signs are negative 
for both variables (Loungani and Sheets 1997, Fischer and 
Sahay 2004). 
Growth Determinants
There is no consensus in the literature about the variables 
significantly and robustly affecting growth. Therefore, 
different model specifications employ a different set of 
variables with only very few consensus variables appear-
ing in all models. In order to identify which variables are 
related to growth by being the ones showing significance 
most of the time in combinations with other variables, 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) runs two million regressions. In his 
regressions, the author combines a couple of consensus 
variables each time and combinations of all the rest of the 
variables proposed in the literature. He is able to identify 
a set of 65 variables that are important to growth in the 
general case. 
It is imperative to employ a comprehensive set of carefully-
selected control variables. Synthesizing the findings of Sala-i-
Martin (1997) and a large body of literature on determinants 
of economic growth (see Barro, 1991; Murphy et al. 1993; 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002), we abstract from 
certain variables generally employed in growth regressions, 
as we believe that these are either irrelevant to our transition 
economies and observation period (war, tropic, disease), do 
not exhibit significant country-specific differences (religion, 
crops), or are endogenous to other important variables (e.g, 
FDI is endogenous to growth). At the same time, we con-
sider variables proposed as impacting growth in transition 
economies (Falcetti et al. 2002, 2006; De Melo et al. 1996, 
2001; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2002; Gulde et al. 2000; 
Havrylyshyn et al. 2003).
Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes variables accounting for 
country-specific initial conditions as important for growth 
in the general case. In their growth studies of transition 
economies, De Melo et al. (2001) and Falcetti et al. (2006) 
employ an index of initial conditions5. The initial conditions 
index incorporates the extent of prior reforms for each 
country in its initial value. I employ this index as it lowers 
endogeneity among different initial conditions variables. 
Since we abstract from the first post-transition years, we 
are not interested in the initial conditions at the beginning 
of the period, but rather, in the interaction of this variable 
with time. Initial conditions can be broken up into two 
principal component clusters, the first of which positively 
and the other - negatively related to growth (De Melo et 
5 Developed  by De Melo et al. (1996), the initial conditions index captures a variety of variables at their initial levels, like income at PPP, urbanization, 
overindustrialization (typical for transition economies), geographical proximity to thriving market economies, natural resource endowments, prior 
economic growth rates, repressed inflation, trade dependence on other communist economies, black market exchange rate premium, change in the 
state structure (new nation states versus members of the decentralized economy), prior economic growth rates, and familiarity with market economy 
at the beginning of transition.
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al. 1996). Therefore, the expected sign of the variable is 
undetermined. Most studies find that different starting 
points matter for growth, yet their impact decreases over 
time (e.g., Berg et al. 1999; De Melo et al. 2001). At the 
same time, the effect of policies on growth should increase 
(Korhonen 2000). 
Romer (1990) and Barro (1991) consider education as 
a major variable affecting growth in general. Senhadji 
(2000) and Rapacki, & Próchniak (2009) find that changes 
in TFP are the most important determinant of growth for 
transition economies. Although in their study of transition 
economies, Falcetti et al. (2006) dismiss education on the 
claim that data on education is of doubtful quality, the 
newly available dataset by Barro and Lee (2011) provides 
the needed information. 
Following the discussions in the wider economic litera-
ture about the importance of ethnic fractionalization on 
growth, we furthermore consider the interaction with 
time of initial level of ethnic fractionalization as a proxy 
for equal access to participation in economic activity. The 
rationale for including the interaction terms  of education 
with time and ethnic fractionalization with time as sepa-
rate variables in the growth regression is that albeit impor-
tant to growth, neither variable has been included in the 
computation of the initial conditions indicator developed 
by De Melo (1996). I do not believe that re-computing the 
initial components indicator to include education and frac-
tionalization would render the results significantly differ-
ent, as neither education, nor ethnic fractionalization are 
much correlated with any of the component variables of 
the initial conditions index. Therefore, the separate inclu-
sion of initial conditions, education time- interaction term, 
and ethnic fractionalization time-interaction term should 
not be a problem. 
Campos and Coricelli (2002) propose liberalization as im-
portant to growth in transition economies. To account for 
liberalization, I use the liberalization, or the so-called struc-
tural policy reform index computed as the weighted aver-
age of all EBRD transition ratings. Radulescu et al. (2002) 
and Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) find that this weighted aver-
age has a better explanatory power on growth than any of 
the individual ratings alone. According to Falcetti (2006), 
the impact of structural policy reforms on growth is strong 
and robust. De Melo et al. (2001) claim that whereas the 
contemporaneous liberalization step is expected to have 
a negative sign, the accumulated stock of reforms is ex-
pected to show a positive sign. Using alternative specifica-
tions but the same liberalization index, Fischer et al. (1996) 
and Selowsky and Martin (1997) confirm these claims. In 
their studies, Heybey and Murrell (1999) and Wolf (1999) 
allow for a feedback of growth to structural reforms and 
Berg et al. (1999) and Ghosh (1997) do likewise by adopt-
ing an instrumental variables approach. Finding a signifi-
cant feedback effect from growth to reforms, Falcetti et al. 
(2002) suggest a simultaneous equation estimation. I fol-
low Falcetti et al. (2006) in considering the lagged value of 
structural policy reform to enter the growth model instead 
of both the current-and lagged values, in order to avoid 
endogeneity.
North (1991), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), 
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Fisher and Sahay (2004) propose 
institutions as important to economic growth. Havrylyshyn 
et al. (2003) and De Melo et al. (2001) consider the impact 
of institutions on growth in transitional economies. Faia et 
al. (2008) finds that with a higher quality of institutions, 
the effects of political pressures on the exchange rate are 
lower. Following De Melo (2001), I use an institutional 
proxy based on the EBRD transition indices6� 
A consensus variable I employ to model growth is the size 
of the fiscal balance relative to GDP, whereby its expect-
ed sign is negative in the growth regression. As Beck and 
Laeven (2005) suggest, not all variables are robust to con-
trolling for additional variables. Therefore, my final model 
discards some of the abovementioned variables.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
The countries covered are Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Esto-
nia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Thereby, we deliberately exclude the initial years of transi-
tion from our sample. The reason for this is that the im-
proved macroeconomic performance after the initial shock 
of break with the command regime could hardly be attrib-
uted to the subsequent country-specific post-transition 
policy reforms. The sample period is 1997-2011 (15 years). 
Our target variables of macroeconomic performance are 
growth rate and inflation. We measure growth as annual 
rate of increase in GDP at constant prices in local currency, 
adjusted for the size of population. In other words, our 
first dependent variable is per capita GDP growth rate. 
These data are obtained from    
It is imperative to employ a comprehensive set of careful-
ly-selected control variables. These control variables, how-
ever, must be non-endogenous to growth performance. 
Synthesizing a large body of literature on determinants of 
economic (see Barro, 1991; Sala-i Martin, 1997; more ?)
As our purpose is to control for determinants, but not symptoms, 
of growth, we should not include endogenous variables that co-
move with growth. For example, FDI inflows are highly correlated 
with growth measured over 3-year windows, however ….
Specifically, the variables (with the corresponding sources) 
we choose to include in our model, are the following:
GDPGi,t - real per-capita GDP growth in local currency 
units, taken from the World Bank for all years except for 
2011. In calculating the 3-year period average, the 2011 
values were obtained from EBRD
4  For an alternative institutional proxy, see Beck and Laeven (2005).
AN OUT-OF-SAMPLE ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF CURRENCY BOARDS IN EUROPEAN TRANSITION ECONOMIES  -  MIHAYLOVA / ÜLKÜ
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  J O U R N A L  O F  M U L T I D I S C I P L I N A R I T Y  I N  B U S I N E S S  A N D  S C I E N C E ,  V o l . 1 ,  N o . 1  /  6 7
Time - number of years since transition, defined each 
3-year period, own calculations
TimeSQ – squared Time to capture non-linear effects of 
time
ICixTime – the interaction of initial conditions with time; 
ICi obtained from the EBRD 2001 Transition report
FRACi xTime – the interaction of ethnic fractionalization 
with time; FRACi obtained from the website of The Macro 
Data Guide International Social Science Resource
EDUCi xTime - completed tertiary education as % of the 
population aged 15 and over; taken from the Barro and 
Lee dataset (2011), which reports the values over 5-year 
periods starting from 1995; exceptions are Belarus and 
Turkey, for which there is no online available data on ter-
tiary education completion
INFLi,t – consumer price inflation at the year-end in %, taken 
from the World Bank for all years except for 2011. In calculat-
ing the 3-year period average, the 2011 values were obtained 
from EBRD. Bulgarian inflation for the first observation period 
has been dropped as the country experienced a big economic 
crisis that could bias our results on growth and inflation per-
formance.
SPRi,t-1 – lagged structural policy reform, also called lib-
eralization; calculated as a weighted average of all EBRD 
reform ratings, specifically: price liberalization and com-
petition policy (weight 0.3); trade and foreign exchange 
system (weight 0.3); large scale privatization, small scale 
privatization, and banking reform and interest rate liberal-
ization (weight 0.4)
SPRSQi,t-1 – squared SPRi,t-1 to capture non-linear effects 
of liberalization
INSTi,t - institutional development and property rights 
and contract enforcement institutions; INSTi,t is different 
in nature from SPRi,t;  INSTi,t is the simple average of EBRD 
reform ratings for competition policy, enterprise restruc-
turing and governance, banking reform and non-bank fi-
nancial institutions reform. Its scale ranges from 1-no re-
form to 4.33-standard typical of market economies; INSTi,t 
obtained from the yearly EBRD Transition reports
GOVEXPi,t-1 – lagged government consumption expendi-
ture in %, taken from the World Bank
WGROWTHi,t – lagged real per-capita GDP world growth, 
taken from the World Bank for all years except for 2011. 
In calculating the 3-year period average, the 2011 values 
were obtained from the IMF 
POLREFi,t - the Polity IV indicator for political reform as a 
proxy for civil liberty with a scale ranging from +10 (strong-
ly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic);  obtained from 
the Polity IV Project for all years except for 2011; In cal-
culating the3-year period average, the 2010 value was 
taken. 
COINTEGR -  the degree of cointegration between the do-
mestic monetary base and foreign exchange in countries 
with a currency board
CB – currency board dummy with a value of 1 for the pres-
ence of a currency board in and 0 otherwise
Float – dummy with a value of 1 for a flexible exchange 
rate regime and 0 otherwise. As the only country with a 
non-CB fixed peg over the years, Latvia would be defined 
with a value of 0 for both the CB and Float dummies
ERM2 – dummy with a value of 1 for participation in the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism II and 0 otherwise; 
information obtained from
Euro – dummy with a value of 1 for having the euro as of-
ficial currency and 0 otherwise
NonEU - dummy with a value of 1 for non-EU members; 
The EU-accession countries would be defined by a value of 
0 for both EU and NonEU
Methodology
We employ a panel data model which captures both cross-
sectional and time-variation. As some of the determinants 
of growth display some (sluggish) variation over time, we 
control for such variation by dividing our 15-years sample 
into five 3-year periods. The average growth rate of coun-
try i in each 3-year subperiod t, Gi,t, is our fist dependent 
variable. Our key explanatory variable is the CB dummy, 
Di,t, which takes the value of 1 for Bulgaria, Lithuania and 
Estonia (1997-2010), and 0 otherwise. We have no time 
variation in this variable (except one subperiod for Esto-
nia), hence a fixed effects estimator would not be suitable 
for our purposes. We therefore estimate the following 
pooled regression with a random effects estimator:
Gi,t,= β0 + β1 Dij,t  + βC X
C
i,t + ei,t                    (1)
      
where Xci,t is a vector of control variables (X
c
i,t = ). The null 
hypothesis is  β1 = 0. A statistical rejection with a positive 
(negative) t-statistic would imply positive contribution of 
CBs to the growth performance.
4. RESULTS
1. Growth results
I checked for unit roots with the help of the Fisher unit root 
test for unbalanced panels and found that my panel vari-
ables do not contain unit roots. Due to the similar specifi-
cation of INSTi,t and SPRi,t-1 from the EBRD indices, they 
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exhibit collinearity (0.6933). Therefore, I drop the variable 
institutions INSTi,t and I use SPRi,t-1 instead. Likewise, 
the variables SPRi,t-1 and POLREFi,t cannot be used in the 
same regression due to a collinearity of 0.82311. The ratio-
nale for these two sets of variables being collinear is that 
reforms (both structural, institutional, political, etc.) tend 
to have a complementary impact, that is, act together. In 
addition to dropping INSTi,t, I drop the dummies for differ-
ent exchange rate regimes, which turned out to be insignif-
icant under different model specifications. The interaction 
terms EDUCi x Time and FRACi x Time have been dropped 
from the growth regression due to the same reason. VARi,t 
was also not used in the final model specifications, as it 
turned out insignificant.
Exhibit 1. FE estimator on growth.
 
 
Running the growth model with a FE estimator (Exhibit 1) 
and making the interpretations on the basis of heteroske-
dasticity-adjusted t-values, I find the CB-dummy to be sig-
nificantly and positively affecting growth for my sample of 
transition economies at the 1%- significance level. How-
ever, the rest of the variables are insignificant.
Exhibit 2. BE estimation on growth. 
Likewise, running the growth model with a BE estimator 
(Exhibit 2), I find that the CB-dummy continues to be sig-
nificantly and positively impacting growth, this time at the 
5%-significance level. The positive and significant impact 
of the CB-dummy under both the FE and BE estimator 
shows that the imputed “credibility” effect of the currency 
board inspired trust in the local currency and markets and 
fostered market activity in our transition economies. In 
addition, the rest of the variables become significant as 
well. Howver, their signs variables are not unequivocally 
determined, but rather are determined empirically in the 
literature, especially by the newer papers, which show a 
rather blurry picture7�
Despite the suggested by literature negative sign of gov-
ernment expenditures on growth, one cannot claim this 
with certainty, since growth does not only depend on the 
amount of expenditure, but also on the quality of the in-
vestment projects the government is investing in. If one 
assumes that the government expenditures during transi-
tion were efficient, then the results are consistent when 
the BE estimator is used and inconsistent when the FE 
estimator is used. A note of caution is needed about the 
temporal impact of government expenditures on growth, 
too. A lot of arguments can be made here, but the sign of 
the variable will ultimately be determined by empirics and 
vary across samples and observation periods.
7For a more detailed discussion, see Falcetti et al. (2006).
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Structural reform has been claimed by the literature to 
have a negative effect on growth in the current period 
but a posive cumulative impact. However, the sign of the 
variable will also be affected by the quality of reform and 
reform continuity. Since the transitional economies exhib-
ited differences in the level of reform in the beginning of 
the transition period, and over time, their pace of reforms 
differed, I assume that this variable will be significant un-
der the RE-estimator. 
I check the RE estimator to make a conclusion on the tem-
porality of the effect of lgovexp ans lspr on growth.
Exhibit 3. RE estimator on growth.
 The RE estimator on growth with robustness-adjusted t-
values (Exhibit 3) shows that government expenditures do 
not significantly impact growth. Looking at the data, one 
can claim that for each country, government expenditures 
were fluctuating around a constant mean across time. 
Therefore, the FE estimator cannot explain the behav-
ior of lgovexp in affecting inflation and the RE estimator 
will shows the impact of the BE-estimator. The BE output 
shows that lgovexp had a positive impact on growth in the 
transition economies over 1997-2011.
Exhibit 4. RE estimator on final growth model.
 Dropping lgovexp from our RE model estimation (Exhibit 
4), I still confirm my previous conclusions about the posi-
tive and significant impact of the CB-dummy. In fact, the 
CB-dummy is also positive and significant under alterna-
tive model specifications.
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2. Inflation Results
Exhibit 5. FE estimator on inflation.
Employing the FE estimator with robustness-adjusted t-values 
on my inflation model (Exhibit 5), I get an  insignificant negative 
effect of the CB-dummy on inflation. The negative sign of the 
dummy is line with theory. At the same time, the sign of the 
lspr is borderline significant and negative. The dummy control-
ling for the inflation period in Bulgaria is likewise significant.
Exhibit 6. BE estimator on inflation.
Under a BE-estimation (Exhibit 6), the CB-dummy is likewise in-
significant and negative. Structural policy reform becomes very 
significant at the 0.01-significance level. The positive sign of the 
CB dummy is not in line with theory. Therefore, to account for 
this incosistency, I include the D_NBG dummy. It is significant.
 Exhibit 7. RE estimator on inflation.
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Under the RE estimation (Exhibit 7), the CB becomes less 
insignificant and the sign remains negative.  This result is 
consistent with theory and the “credibility effect” of the 
currency board’s operation.  Since the significance of the 
variables in the inflation model did not change drastically 
when employing the FE-, BE-, and RE estimators, one can 
claim that the RE-estimator is indeed the optimal one for 
describing the impact of the currency boards on inflation.  
5. CONCLUSION
Whether the new-generation currency boards in Eastern 
Europe attain their basic goals of price stability and 
ultimately higher average growth rates was a pending 
question in the international finance literature. We fill 
this gap by providing out-of-sample evidence free of post-
launch effects.
Appropriately controlling for other determinants of growth 
that are not endogenous, we establish a mild positive 
effect of CBs on growth performance and a negative 
effect on inflation. As is usually the case in the general 
growth literature, the statistical significance of our results 
is sensitive to the specification and other control variables 
employed, but a synthesis of our results suggests that the 
effect of CBs on inflation and growth performance is in the 
desired sign and at borderline levels of significance. Hence, 
our results imply that currency boards in European transition 
economies basically fulfill the role expected of them.   
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